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IN THE

Supreme Court
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
KEXXECOTT COPPER CORPORATIOX, a corporation, and BINGHAM AND GARFIELD RAIL\VAY COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaifnti[fs,
vs.
STATE TAX

Case No.

7298

COM~1:ISSION,

Defend1ant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties hereto have cooperated below in endeavoring to shape an inherent'ly complicated tax record
in such manner that there could be presented concisely
for the determination of this court six questions of principle. The mathematical results to follow when these
principles are determined may then be worked out with1
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out, it is expected, subjecting the court to such details.
·Therefore the facts herein are stipulated in an ''Agreed
Record'' (R. 101-113) amplified by a brief formal hearing before the Commission. (R. 39-100.)
A.

As To The Parties

The Commission is a body politic created and
existing in accordance with the Constitution of the State
of Utah and authorized by law to administer Chapter
13 of Title 80 of the Utah Code, known as the Corporation Franchise ~eax Act.
1.

2 (a). Kennecott Copper Corporation is a corporation of the State of New York duly quaHfied to do and
doing business there as well as in Utah and other states.
It owns and operates the well-known Utah Copper Mine
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Its ores from this
mine are then transporit:ed to its mills at Magna and
Arthur. This transportation at the time here involved
was over the tracks of the Bingham and Garfield Railway
Company, which is a wholly owned subsidiary. ('The
Utah Corporation Franchise Tax returns of that com.pany are consolidated with Kennecott's and for all purposes herein this transportation operation wrll be included as part of the Utah Copper Division operations
of Kennecott.)
(b). The n1ill concentrates of Kennecott are smelted
at Garfield and o<ther smelters in Utah and elsewhere
under contract arrangements with the American Smelting
and Refining Company and other smelting companies.
Blister copper, the product of the sm·elting, is then trans2
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ported by Kenneeot t through the service of various cmnmon ean·ier~ to refineriPs, all of which are outside of
the ~tate of Utah. Kennecott has no interest in any of
these coBmwn carrier~ or in any of the smelting and
refining emnpanies.
(c). The refined product is then sold for Kenneeott':s account by Kennecott Sales Corporation, which is
a whoUy owned subsidiary and which receives an agreed
eommission for such services. Part of Kennecott's copper precipitates is neither smelted nor refined, but is
~old by Kennecott as produced. (At all times until sale,
the ores from the Utah Copper J\fine remain Kennecott's
despite ehanges due to milling, smelting and refining.)
(d). In the course of Kennecott's operations it engages the service of and pays a substantial number of
employees in Utah and in the other s~tates in which it is
engaged in business. Kennecott purchases great quantities of equipment, materials and supplies both within and
outside the State of Utah for necessary use and consumption in the course of its operations. (R. 101-3; 'Stip.
par. I.)
B.

As To The Deficiency Assessment.

1. Kennecott and the Commission were once before
engaged in controversy with respect to the two main
issues here, namely, the method of al~ocating a proper
proportion of Kennecott's inconie to the Btate of Utah,
and the method of computing the deduction to be allowed
for depletion of its mining properties under the Corporation Franchise Tax Act. The taxable years involved were
8
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1935 to 1941 inclusive. VVhile this controversy was pending in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, Case No.
6324, a mutually satisfactory settlement was agreed upon
and by stipulation the proceedings were dismissed under
date of May 27, 1942.

2. Under the terms of this settlement certain principles for computing Kennecott's franchise tax liability
were mutually agreed upon and applied to each of the
years 1935 to 1941 inclusive. The corporation franchise
tax returns filed by Kennecott for the calendar years
1942, 1943 and 1944 were likewise prepared and filed in
exact conformance wi~th such principles; and in accordance therewith the tax was computed, levied and paid
for each such year and for the taxable year 1942 in the
sum of $174,100.54.
3. Notwithstanding the foregoing settlement and
the further fact that there were no changes in the personnel of the Commission, by letter dated March 10, 1945
the Commission proposed adjustments in the tax and
assessed a deficiency or additiona1 tax for the year 1942
in the sum of $232,722.66. Kennecott objected to said
deficiency by petition for redetermination timely filed,
claiming a refund of the tax paid. (R. 103-4; Stip. par.

II.)
C.

Kennecott's Two Requests

Among other matters, the May, 1942 agreement involved the following:
(a). The taxpayer was to file, not for its entire
operations, but on the basis of its Utah Copper Division
4
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ineome alone; and it was to allocate to Utah a proportion
of that inc01ne on the basis of certain variable but agreed
factors. (T. 109-10; :S:tip. par. IY.)
(b). In con1puting the allowance for depletion, federal taxes were not first deducted. (T. 108-9; Stip. par.
III (B).)
(c). Fina:lly, in cmnputing the depletion allowance,
all Utah ~lines Division net incom·e. resulting from produetion of metals was treated as ''net income from the
property." (R.. 105-8; Stip. par. III (A).)
(Parenthetically it may here be noted that the principles under this agreement were a logical and reasonable
development of the transition of the old Utah Copper
Company into the Kennecott Copper Corporation with
its manifold operations in addition to those in Utah.
Kennecott does not contend that the agreement was 1egally binding on the Commission as to the returns subsequent to 1941.)
Subsequently the Commission chose, by its deficiency
assessment made herein, to depart from the principles
of the 1fay 1942 agreement; whereupon Kenneco tt in
turn, in connection with its petition for redetermination
and the hearing thereon, contended that it, too, had such
a right and made the following two requests or contentions:
1

First: That Utah's statutes require in the abs·ence
of agreement or a determination under subsection 8 of
Section 80-13-21, that the ~tax be based upon a return reporting the corporation's over-all operations, and then
5
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invoking the statutory allocation formula to determine
the taxable 1Jtah income. ( R. 110; Btip. par. IV (3).)
Since agreement seemed no longer possible in view of
the Commission's change of attitude, on January 19,
1948 Kennecott filed its Amended Return on the corporate basis as required by Section 80-13-21 (1-7). (R. 110,
228-34.)
Second: That it be permitted to change to the Utah
cost-or-value method of determining depletion (Section
80-13-9 (a) ) , or in the alternative preferably to the federal percentage method, since the state percentage method as then interpreted and applied by the Commission
resulted in a denial of the required reasonable allowance
for depletion. (R. 105; Stip. par. III.) The reasons
g·iven for this request were detailed in the testimony at
the formal hearing and will be summarized hereafter in
connection with the argument on this point.

Kennecott also raised other points now moot because
conceded by the Commission, attacked the Franchise Act
as the Connnission would here apply it as unconstitutional, and objected to the inclusion of federal subsidies
as gross income. (R. 131-147.)

D.

The Commission's Decision

The Commission's decision is silent with respect to
some of these matters, but it is not in dispute that by its
decision and the accommpanying schedules (R. 16-36):

First: The agreement of May, 1942 was still invoked
6
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to th(_} t>xtent that tlte tax wa8 still computed on the agreement basis. and not on the basis of Kennecott's run ended
return covering ih~ entir~ operations and then allocating
ineome to Utah.
Second: The agreement of May, 1942 was not fol!O'lred in at least three respects:

(a). .--\.n allocation of total income to ''mining''
has now been n1ade by a Commission-devised seH-proving
formula, thus eliminating such excluded part of the to tal
income fron1 the property in computing depletion. (Ex.
±, R. 226.)
1

(b). In computing depletion federal taxes have now
first been deducted.
(c). \Yhile treating the Utah Copper Division as a
separate tax unit for some purposes, the Commission on
the other hand now uses Kennecott's entire operations
in other respects, such as for the allocation of federal·
taxes to Utah.

Third: 'The position of the plaintiff that if the Commission were to depart from the May, 1942 agreement,
Kennecott, too, would be freed therefrom, and its two
requests above outlined would therefore be proper, was
completely ignored.
E. Payment and Review

~:

\Yithin the time allowed by law plaintiff deposited
with the defendant the amount found by it to he due, and
applied for and obtained from this court the statutory
writ of review. (R. 3-14.)
7
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II.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
1. The Tax Commission erred in refusing to follow
the Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act ( §80-13-21)
which in the case of a taxpayer doing business in several
states requires that the tax shall be based upon a return
including the company's operations in those staJtes and
then allocating to Utah its proportion of that total income
in accordance with the statutory formula.

2. The State Tax Commission erred in that it has
fai led to allow the taxpayer the required reasona:ble
allowance for depletion.
1

3. The Commission has misinterpreted the Utah
statutes establishing the percentage formula for determining depletion.
4. The Tax Commission erred in that it has discriminated against this taJrpayer and is attempting to
take its property without due process of law in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and Sections 7 and 24, Article I, of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.
5. The Tax Commission erred in including in the
tax base subsidies paid to plaintiff by the F,ederal Government.

III.
ARGUMENT
1. The Tax Oommi:ssion erred in refusing to follow the
Utah Oorporation Franchise Tax Act (§80-13-21) which
8
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in the case of a t.:1.xpayer doing business in several states
requires that the tax shall be based upon a return indu.ding
the company's operations in those states and then albcati:ng
to Utah its proportion of that· total incom~e in acoordance
with the statutory formula.
This question is the fan1iliar one of how a fair proportion of the income of the multi-state corporation shaH
be assigned or allocated for tax purposes to any particular state. Utah has met the question with the statutory
mandate of § 80-13-21 which requires reporting of the
taxpayer's total income, and then after segregating and
providing for the treatment of rents, interest, dividends
and capital gains, provides:
( 6) If the bank or other corporation carries
on any business outside this state, the said remainder may be divided into three equal parts:
(a) Of one third, such portion shall be attributed to business carried on with this state as
shall be found by muUiplying said ~third by a
fraction whose numerator is the value of the corporation's tangible property situated within this
state and whose denominator is the value of all
the corporation's tangible property wherever
situated.
(b) Of another third, such portion shall be
attributed to business carried on within this state
as shall be found by multiplying said third by a
fraction whose numerator is the total amount
expended by the corporrution for wages, salaries,
commissions or other compensation to its employees and assignable to this state and whose denominator is the total expenditures of the corporation for wages, salaries, commissions or other
compensation to all of its employees.
9
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(c) Of 'the rema1nrng third, such portion
shall be attributed to business carried on within
this state as shall be found by multiplying said
third 1by a fraction whose numerator is the amount
of the corporation's gross receipts from business
assignable to this sta:te, and whose denominator
is the amount of the corporation's gross receipts
from all its business.
Subsection (8) then provides:
(8) If in the judgment of the tax. commission the application of the foregoing ru1es does
not allocate to this S'tate the proportion of net
income fairly and equitably attributable to this
state, it may with such information as it may be
able to obtain make such allocation as is fairlv
calculated ·to assign to this state the portion o.f
net income reasonably attributable to the business
done within this state and to avoid subjecting
the taxpayer to double taxation.
As heretofore noted, the taxpayer and the Commission through 1941 by agreement had invoked an alternative 1nethod to the standard three-part" :Massachusetts
formula." Now, can the Comn1ission ex-parte change
those agreed principles and without further ado substitute its own new allocation rnethod; or is not such action
arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law unless and until
subsection ( 8) is properly invoked~
The Comrnission once before tried just this 2 and in
1939 was to'ld by this court that the legislature intended
the Commission to depart from the formula only whenever the application if its provisions does not allocate to
the state the business fairly attributable to it. California
10
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Packing Corporation
367, 93 P. 2d -!63.

Y.

State Tax Commission, 97 Utah

Amplifying this staten1ent, J-ustices Wolfe and :McDonough noted:

• * • In detennining the ''portion of net
incon1e as~ignable to business done within this
state'· the commission "may" use the rules set
out in the main opinion. This does not mean that
the Commission may ignore the rules and choose
its 0"\Yn. '' nlay •' has the meaning of "should,"
i.e., should follow the rules unless ·the rules. fail
to accomplish the overarching purpose as revealed
by subsection (8). It is only in cas·e an application of the rules as laid down fails to "aUocate
to this state the proportion of net income fairly
and equitably attributable •to this state'' (subsection 8), or, on the other hand, where the rules
would subject the taxpayer to so-called double
taxation that the Commission may depart from
them. This conclusion is fortified by the fact
that the word "may" is used, together with the
fact that the entire purpose of the rule is to arrive
at a figure "fairly calculated to assign to this
state the portion of the net income reasonab~y
attributable to the business done within the state
and to avoid subjeeting the taxpayer to double
taxation." * * * (p. 380)
1

Also:

* * * If a corporation had much property
here as compared to its total property, but did
little business here, it would on the first third
of its total net income from sales, under subsection (6) (a), pay a disproportionate tax, but
this might he compensated for under subsection
( 6) (c), depending on how subsection ( 6) (e) (1st)
is interpreted. Usually the proportions of its
11 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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total wages and salaries attributable to Utah, calculated under subsection ( 6) (b), related to the
tota!l wages and salaries paid everywhere would
represent a fair proportion of net income allocable
to Utah, compared to total net income from all
sales. And frequently the inequities which might
ensue from the use of just one of the fractions
defined by subsection (G) (a), (b) and (c), would
be compensated by the use of the three fractions
each based on a third of the total net income
(excluding that set out in subsections (3) and (4).
But here and there by the use of all these fractions a marked inequity might still remain either
against the state or against the taxpayer, in which
case subsection (8) comes into play. (p. 384.)
In that case in applying the law the court held that
the taxpayer was ''the usual and ordinary manufacturing
company and there is shown no reason for departing
fron1 the regular method of computation to determine
the amount of its franchise tax." So, here, the taxpayer
is the usual and ordinary mining company; it has property in Utah and elsewhere; has employees here and else·where; and rnakes sales here and elsewhere.
The record is silent as to why the Commission ignored Kennecott's return, which after this controversy.,
arose \vas based upon the statutory formula. It is apparent that the formula gives a less favorable result in
total tax dollars due insofar as the State of Utah is concerned; but this court in its opinions has never sanctioned
this end as justification for departure from ~egislative
mandate. We would venture that the individual members
of the Commission have never even looked at Exhibit
1 (R. 219-223), which was explained by the witness Par12
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spn::-: at pggp 51 of the record. On cross exmnination the
counsel fluffed off the matter by suggesting
that Kennecott had not first obtained "pern1ission to
change"; and ~lr. Parsons ad1nitted that he knew of no
such request. (R. 3~)) However, to the extent such a request "·as necessary (we believe it not) counsel for plaintiff then made it clear that Kennecott did so submit such
a request to the Comn1ission. ( R. 53) Furthermore this
fact was apparent to any who had bothered to read Kennecott's letter of January 19, 1948 which accompanied the
filing with the Commission of the amended return based
upon the statutory forn1ula. (Augmented Record, pp.

Commission'~

228-34.)

But without further ado the statute and return pursuant thereto were ignored by the Commission, which
apparently by its decision in the main merely rubberstamped the ingenious staff attempts designed to gain
more revenue. In doing this the Commission acted regardless of the fact that the staff report disregarded
prior commitments by the Commission, its own administratiye practice over the years, and the statutes of the
State of Utah as construed by this court.
2. The State Tax Commission erred in that it has
failed to allow the taxpayer the required reasonable allowance for depletion.
a.

Legislati~e

History of Depletion.

An elementary principle peculiar to operations such
as mining is that ore in place is a wasting asset. Like
money in the bank, there is only so much; and when withdrawn pro tanto it is gone. Hence returns from mining

13
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are ''income'' only to the extent that excluded from the
gross is a proper allowance for depletion, and hence
under both state and federal statutes based upon income
there is afforded a deduction for depletion. 27 Am. Jur.,
"Income Taxes," §§ 122-125.
In New Park Mining Company, et al v. State Tax
Cmmnission, 196 P. 2d 485, this court said:

'' * * * The theory upon which wasting assets
corporations, such as mining companies, are
aUowed a deduction for depletion, is that the corporation franchise tax is a tax on income or upon
the increment produced by capital, and not upon
the capital itself. Hence, wasting assets corporations are allowed a deduetion for depletion on
the theory that the taxpayer thus recoups its
capital investment. * * *"
The statutory wording requires the deduction of •'a
reasonable allowance for depletion *'»* .according to the
peculiar conditions in each case ; such reasonable allowance in all cases to be made under rules and regulations
to be prescribed by the tax commission." ( § 80-13-8(8),
Utah Code Annotated 1943.)
(Parenthetically, it should here be noted that the
Cmnmission contends in effect that these words in the
Inain are Ineaningless, since the taxpayer can utilize but
two possible methods of dep'letion computation.)
This principle being clear, its administration becomes complicated only in the determination of what is
the proper base for depletion ''in each case.'' If excessive, the operator will not be paying his full income tax;
14
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if deficient, the ta..'\:ing authority will be atten1pting improperly to collect taxes based other than on incon1e. It
~lwuld be noted that in contrast w·ith the Federa!l Government, the State Tax Conunission has n1ade no general
rule~ and regulations covefing depletion. (R. 104)
At first Congress established as the base for computing depletion the value of the particular mine (or its
eost where that exceeded value) as of the effective date
of the income tax laws, or its cost (today discovery value)
at the tin1e of acquisition if such occured subsequent
thereto. This Inethod was likewise adopted by ,the Utah
Leg·islature in 1931 ( § 80-13-8 (9a) ), and is still the
method prescribed by both state and federa l governments
for determining capital loses or gains in the event of sale
of the mining property. (§§ 80-13-8 (9a), 80-13-14; Witnes~ Earl, R. 59-60, 71-2.)
1

But mining ventures are both speculative and their
Yalue is often extremely difficult to determine as of any
giyen date such as January 1, 1931. (R. 218) :So Congress, after extensive studies of the problem, devised an
alternative second method-15% of the gross proceeds,
but not to exceed 50% of the net; and presently the taxpayer is permitted to make a choice each year of either
method. (R. 73-4) This percentage method is not just an
arbitrary allowance, but was adopted by Congress as
fair to both the Government and the taxpayer. Based
upon extensive studies and hearings, the precise percentage adopted was directly related to typical actuaHy ascertained values. (R. 73-4) These studies indicated that the
metal mining industry received in depletion allowances
based upon cost-or-value an average deduction equiva15
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lent to about 17% of their gross sales, reported the Joint
Congressional Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation,
p. G8, Vol. I, Par·t 8, submitted to Congress September
19, 1929. 'The Committee therefore recommended:
''From the study of this subject it is believed
that 15 per cent of the gross sales value with a
50 per cent limitation to net income, 'vould be a
reasonable rate to allow the metal-mining industry
for the future. This reduction by 2 per cent of
the actual figures shown in the summary is
thought advisable to offset the continuing effect
of the percentage depletion method.
''The 15 per cent depletion allowance on
gross sales is equivalent to a th~oretical deduction of 30 per cent on net income. In actual
operations the 30 per cent on net may vary 15
per cent above or below this figure, depending on
the profits made by the particular operation.''
As the United States was amending its laws to carry
into effect these committee recommendations, Utah in
1931 was adopting its own state corporation franchise
tax as the result of the Professor Lutz tax studies under
the Dern administration. A percentage method was likewise included as an alternative to value by § 80-13-8 (9)
(b), but was set at 33 1-3 per cent of the ·•net income
from the property *** computed without allowance for
depletion. '' After once making an election of method,
however, the taxpayer cannot subsequently change without the Tax Commission's consent.
b.

History in K·enneoott's Case.

Kennecott (we include its predecessor) in 1931 made
the election required by the new Utah statute. It accepted
16
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the percentage method which it has consistently followed
until tl1e instant controversy. (R. 104) When in 1932
Kennecott, as well as other Utah mines, elected to invoke
the state percentage n1ethod, it is important to note that
the Tax Comn1ission 's initial return fonns permitted,
and those concerned invariably interpreted the statute
to provide for: ( 1) no allocation of income fron1 the
mining property to "n1ining"; and (2), no prior deduction of federal taxes. (R. 106, 62). Kennecott, as well
as others, filed its returns on this basis and these returns
were acc~·pted by the Commission from 1931 and for
many years sttbsequent thereto. (R. 108)
1

In 1943, however, when the federal tax had become
a most substantial factor, the Commission reviewed its
practice; determined that the terms of the statutes required federal taxes to be first deducted before conlputing depletion if the percentage method were to be inYoked; amended its return forms to so provide ( Stip.
III (B), R. 108); and successfully sustained this position
in 1948 in the New Park ~fining Company et aJ. cases
supra. (R. 109) The court in that opinion, however,
noted that the taxpayers there had elected to compute
depletion under the percentage method; and the brief of
the Commission in those cases constantly reiterated that
the plaintiffs had not sought permission to change to a
method other than Utah's percentage formula. In this
connection, on March 14, 1944 the Commission had written:
''Please be advised that the Tax Commission has denied the request of the Utah Mining
Congress for a change in the method of comput-

17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing depletion. The Commission feels that the
law makes it manda tory to deduct federal taxes
before computing depletion.
1

''However, the Commission would be very
sympathetic to a request for a change from the
percentage depletion method to the cost method
in determining depletion.''
(Ex. 5; R. 227.)
In the case now before the court Kennecott sought
to 1nake just such a change. (Ex. 3; R. 225.) But the
effect of the decision was to deny that request. No reason
is assigned for this action, which plaintiff attacks as
arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law.
This request was in the nature of a third choice or
preference, since the taxpayer primarily requested and
still suggests as the fair·est and most practical method
the use of the Federal percentage method, to be available
of course to all mines. Mr. Earl described the history
and advantages in detail of that method and recommended that it be followed by the Commission. (R. 77)
But the Commission apparently is of the opinion that l\Ir.
Earl's remarks and Kennecott's request in this respect
should be addressed to the legislature; i.e., in Utah,
depletion under the law as it stands must be based upon
one of only two alternatives. (R. 87)
Thus, also, the point is here presented as to whether
or not this restrictive construction is correct. If it is,
the words ''according to the peculiar conditions in each
case" are use less, as also is the standard of "a reasonable allowance'' applied to the facts of this. case.
1
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The defendant by its decision reduced still further
the proposed allowance of $6,455,813.78 and determined
that the allowance for depletion in this case should be
$6,089,670.26 (Schedule 8, R. 27), the gross Utah Copper
Division income for that year being $85,513,885.12. ( Schedule 11, R. 31.) This figure is roughly 50 per cent of the
allowance computed under any of the following recognized rnethods for determining a ''reasonable allowance'':
No. 1-Federal value method ____________ $12,438,135.57
X o. 2-Federal percentage method.. $10,650,822.81
No. 3-Utah value method ________________ $14,007,442.00
No. -±-Utah percentage method
(before Commission's
changes in interpretation) .. $12,822,347.09
(Utah as allowed __________________ $6,089,670.26)
(Ex. 3; R. 255.)
The witness Geo. C. Earl, plaintiff's Chief Engineer,
is a man of extensive training and practical experience.
He is intirnately familiar with mining pro'Perties and
particularly the mine in question, and an expert in the
field of mine valuation. (R. 57, et seq.) Neither his
qualifications nor the engineering determinations of
value (or for that matter the percentage calculations) are
in dispute. He expressed the opinion that any of the
above four methods applied to the peculiar circumstances
of this case would afford a reasonable allowance for
depletion within the permissive limits of administrative
judgment (R. 74); that a variation in the application of
19
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these n1ethods of from ten to fourteen million dollars
was within the limits of judgment (R. 75); but that the
dilninu tion of the depletion a'llowance to the six million
dollar figure used by the Commission, or less than fifty
·per cent, was "wholly unreasonable" and had "absolutely no relationship" to the actual operations and a
fair allowance. (R. 76.)

Q. Now, Mr. Earl, do you recognize that a
variation between some of these methods from
Ten Million to Fourteen MiUion is within the limitations of judgmenU This is correct, isn't iO
A.

Yes, Sir.

Q. But with the diminution of that allowance
to Six Million or less than 50% is, in your opinion,
unreasonable~

A.

Wholly unreasonable.

Q. And has no relationship to the fact of the
actual operation out there as you know it to be~
A. It has absolutely no relationship.
(Tr. 37-8.)
Plaintiff's position accordingly is that this record
shows an arbitrary and capricious attitude on the part
of the Commission, resulting in denial to plaintiff of the
required statutory deduction of a reasonable allowance
for depletion. The commission should have granted the
request of Kennecott to compute the allowance ·either and
preferably on the federal percentage basis, or on the
Utah value-of-January 1, 1931 method under the circumstances. It is, we submit, evident that the Commission's
20
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staff's objective was to apply mathematics and to interpret the law to produce the lowest possib le result in dollars assignable to this deduction, rather than to allow a
reasonable amount. (R. ~)2)
1

C~IR ~-\.LLISON)

:

~-\..

I don't feel in a position to express an
opinion as to the reasona}bleness of this or any
other depletion allowance. In our determination
\Ye have attempted to apply the statutory requirements for the depletion allowance, and we haven't,
as ~-\.uditors, concerned ourse;lves with the reasonableness of the result obtained.
As will be noted from the rather brief record herein,
the answer to these charges is largely silence. However,
there did occur staff attempts to justify their action in
that it \vas shown that from 1931 through 1941 the Commision had allowed $52,240,744.01 in depletion (R. 94) on
the taxpayer's own 1931 base of but $11,419,540.00. (R.
83, 9'5) The latter was a hearsay figure at the time it
was first utilized, confusing Commissioner Hammond,
who said (R. 84): "How can you say that for one year
the six million dollar charge for depiletion is unreasonable
when that is more than half the amount of the fair value
of the property as reported by the Company***~"
Mr. Earl replied (R. 84-5):
The figure to which you refer, Mr. Hammond,
I am not at all familiar with it. I do not know
the basis upon which it was reported, or anything
else, and I cannot answer that question, but I do
21
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know this, that the basis set out in your statute
is the fair market value of that mine as of that
date. There (that) would be hundreds of millions
of doHars, and that is what we are concerned with
on depletion, regardless of any other figures.
Your statute says it shall be the fair market value
of the property as of that date. Now, the rules for
detennining the fair market value of a mine have
long been established. They hav·e been recognized
by the government, by purchasers of property,
and people who have properties for sale. And the
only thing about it, it is not subject to an exact
determination because judgment has to enter into
the factors used. Now, I say I don't know what
that figure (the hearsay figure) is; I don't know
the basis for reporting it. Investment and market
value as of a date have no relationship whatever.
COM. HAMMOND: It just occured to me it
was necessary to have some explanation ·of that
great discrepancy in view of the fact that I think
we generally agree that the purpose of allowing
a deduction from a gross in arriving at the net
income of a mine is to look for the return of
capital, and that here, this report seems to have
two figures; One of them Eleven Million Dollars
plus as a fair value of the mine, and another figure, Eight Million Dollars plus as the book value
of the mine. Now, those figures as I understand
it haven't yet been presented here, and I don't
know just how sound the basis is upon which I
am making that inquiry, but the figures seem to
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be so far apart it seems to rne yon could make
sonu? explanation that would in s01ne way justify
your conclusions that the Six l\iillion Dollar figure
wasn't reasonable.

The next day (reporter not present) it developed
that the figure in doubt was based upon the net proceeds
mine Yaluation for the depression year in question (Ex.
6, Schedule "'H", Items (1 and 6, R. 217); and thus, as
stated by 1Ir. Earl, it was without re lationship to the
different statutory basis for depletion to be allowed for
income tax purposes.
1

Here we can only speculate as to what was the true
basis for the decision in this case which without explanation sustained the depletion but at a figure reduced even
below that made before the hearing. It is appreciated
keenly that in this instance the latitude of the Comrnission is extensive, and that the burden is upon Kennecott
to pursuade this court that the action taken was an abuse
of discretion. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 114 F. 2d 882.
But not only is the record barren of anything Inaterial and relevant other than Mr. Earl's undisputed testimony that the allowance was below the limits of judgment; affirmatively it is shown that the amount allowed
is only about 50% of what would be ''reasonable'' under
both of the Federal methods here applicable, the Utah
cost-or-value method and the Utah percentage method
as previously construed.

23
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Further, an examination of the statutes and methods
of other states reveals support for Kennecott's position.
For example, the following states directly tie their depletion computation to the optional federal methods:
California-Sec. 8g, Bank & Corporation, Act of
1945
Connecticut-Sec. 419c, Supp., Conn. Gen. Statutes 1930
Idaho-Sec. 61-2407 (c-1), Idaho Code Ann. 1932
1\iontana-Sec. 2297 (Third), Mont. Rev. Statutes
1935
Oklahoma-Sec. 880 (g), 68 Okla. Statutes 1941
Oregon-Sec. 110-1508 (g), Oregon Comp. Laws
Ann.
Vermont-Sec. 890, Vermont Public Laws 1933
Three states have accomplished the same result, since
in Tennessee, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island the entire
'law is based upon the federal tax. And the following tie
in to the federal method by regulation:
Georgia-'Sec. 92'-3109, Georgia Code 1933
Kansas-Sec. 79-3206 (11) Gen. Stat. Kans. 1953,
Reg. 54
Louisiana-Sec. 8587.9 (m) La. Gen. :Stat. 1939,
Reg. 96
Maryland-Sec. 224(j-1) Ann. Code 1939·, Reg. 4
Five additional states have delegated plenary regulatory powers to the administering agencies: Arizona,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico and North Carolina.
24
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Eight appear to tie depletion into cost-or-value alone;
two apparently do not recognize the depletion deduction;
and the ren1aining eighteen do not appear to have a comparable tax.
Thus, \Ye submit, we find support in the policies and
practices of other states to a most substantial degree
that:
a. The Utah Commission has failed to follow the legislative mandate to allow reasonable
depletion in this case.
1

b. The Utah statutes intend to delegate to
the Commission wide latitude by regulation applicable to aH, to invoke any sound method whereby to compute that reasonable allowance. The
Commission is not hamstrung between an unreasonable percentage formula, and a difficult single
alternative.
c. The method-federal percentage-is reasonable, practical, simple, fair and recognized as
sound.
d. In any event, Kennecott shoUld be afforded the alternative of utilizing the Utah costor-value method of January 1, 1931.
Plaintiff suggests that subsections 8 and 9 of Sec.
80-13-8 are ambiguous and conflicting. Either alone
would present a clear legislative policy. Together, the
Commission's view would nullify subsection 8 leaving 9
a1one. Plantiff's view would give heed to the rule of
construction "in pari materia'' (50 Am. Jur. 342 et

25
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seq., Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P.
2d 937.) and find the legislative intent to be to give effect
to both. That is, the key criterion is a" reasonable allowance'' under subsection 8; but two possible methods are
then authorized as aids by subsection 9, without restricting the determination of the allowance to only those
rnethods and thus preventing the Commission from utilizing modern improvements in computation. Either that
was the legislative intent, or there has been set up a
peculiar statute with less ~atitude than in practically
every other state which has considered the problem; and
as noted, subsection 8 might just as well have been
omitted.
3. The Commission has misinterpreted tbe Utah statutes ~establishting tbe percentage formula for determining
depletion.

Assuming for the purpose of argument that the defendant Commission acted within its prerogatives in
denying plaintiff's request to change over to either the
Utah value method or the federal percentage method;
that is, that plaintiff is forced to remain within the percentage method straight jacket to which it submitted
under administrative representations which turned out
to be illusory. (R. 62)
We concede that under the New Park decision supra
federal taxes must first be deducted in determining depletion when this method is invoked. But plaintiff submits that in making an allocation of the income from the
property to various steps such as ''mining,'' the Comrnission has misconstrued and therefore has violated the
law.
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The percentage method statute provides that the
allowance for depletion shall be one-third of the net income '• from the property.'' Plaintiff contends that all of
its income from Utah Copper Division is from the property: namely, the Bingham Canyon mine.
This court noted at the end of the New Park decision
that when § 80-13-8 (9b) qualified the words "net income" with the words "from the property," the legis-·
lative purpose was to prevent a wasting assets corporation from taking a deduction for depletion "fron1 all
income, from whatever source derived.'' It wi'll he noted
here that Schedules 7 and 12 properly excluded fron1 the
base to which the percentage was applied all income other
than from the Bingham Canyon mine.
a. In the first place, the Commission's contention
is here directly in the teeth of its own administrative
interpretation of the Act from 1931 to date. It has never
heretofore attempted to apply this novel accounting invention either as to Kennecott or any other Utah mine.
(R. 106)
As noted on page 6 of the Agreed Record, the Commission's instructions with respect to depletion were not
amended in this respect until 1943, which for the first
time brought into the picture the requirement of allocating income to sources other than ''mineral extraction.''
(R. 107)
b. Further, the federal statute which was originally
the model for Utah's provisions, ·even as. am-ended to define and delimit ''from the property," has not been construed to require such an allocation. With respect to the
27
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specific Kennecott properties here involved the federal
counterpart has been given the same construction heretofore applied by the Utah Commission from 1916 to date.
(11:r. Earl's testimony, R. 68-70.)
c. Finally, the accounting invention (Ex. 4, R. 226)
is an admittedly self-proving formula. (R. 91,70)
'The formula reads as fol1ows:
D 2 + D (2TC + TNI) - TNI. MC
3
3

=

0

which its inventor, Mr. Allison, on page 91 of the record
said was a quadratic equation which determined depletion by the particular formula ''because the depletion
itself allowable under the statute depends upon the
amount of depletion allowable.'' Mr. Ear1 pointed out
that "I was taught very early in my mathematics that a
formula which defined anything in terms of itself should
not be used. Now, this formula does that very thing***."
(R. 70)
It is respectfully submitted that here again is an
irlustration where the Commission is arrogating unto
itself the power arbitrarily to create and apply mathematical formulae to the sole end that in the particular case
a higher tax results. Only the Commission's accountants
could conceive that when the legislature in plain words
allowed depletion for the average mine operator, selfproving quadratic equations were contemplated.
In considering the words ''gross income from the
property" as used in the Federal statute, the United
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SU;ttes Supren1e Court has said that ''the term should
be taken in its natural sense.'' Further: ''Gross incon1e
fr?m time to time may be more or less than market value
according to the bearing of particular contracts. We do
not think that we are at li.be.rty to construct a the1oretical
gross income by recourse to the expense of productvon
operations.''
Helvering v. ~fountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S.
276, 82 L. ed. 907, 58 S. Ct. 623.
So here the plain and natural meaning seems to
treat as the "net income from the property" the mnount
received from the sales of copper-the taxpayer's first
marketable product which came from the Utah Copper
J.Iine. This is what has ·been accepted without question
by both state and federal taxing agents until the present
attempt. This is what the legislature of Utah must have
intended when it enacted the corporation franchis~e tax
in 1931 as applied to mining operations well known to
exist here for nearly a century. Certainly if the legislature had intended to substitute a theoretical income by
the operator, it would have said so.
The question may well he asked at what point should
the cut-off be made in cases such as Kennecott where
conceivably expansion could continue into fabrication,
and possibly even branch enterprises for the actual utilization of the product such as for copper roofs in homes.
These indeed might entail income from activities other
than "mining" in its "natural sense." We would submit that the natural cut-off point should he at the end
of the ~irst normally n?Jarketable product; and indeed
29
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this is the rule of Section 114 of the Federal Internal
Hevenue Code, where by statute Congress amended the
old la-\v cmnparable to Utah's now to define "gross inem up fron1 the property" as follows:
As used in this paragraph the term ''gross
income from the property'' means the gross income from mining. The term "mining'' as used
herein shall be considered to include not merety
the ·extraction of the ores or minerals from the
ground but also the ordinary treatment processes
normally applied by mine owners or operators in
order to obtain the comercially marketable mineral product or products.
Here as noted, the commerciaHy marketable mineral
products of Kennecott are sold when first possible in the
normal course of operation-the copper after it is finally
produced in marketable form by refining. (R. 102)
Further, the only Commission rule on this subject
-in contrast with Federal Statute-is the 1943 change in
Instruction 21 to read:
In cases where the taxpayer engaged in activities in addition to, or derives income from
sources other than, mineral extraction, deductions
not directly attributable to any particular activity
or source of income sha!ll be fairly allocated.
As stipulated and undisputed, such profits or income
attri'hutable to smelting, transportation, refining and
selling the first marketable product have already been
exc1uded by payments to the several companies performing those services. (R. 66-70, 102.) This practice has
continued since long before Utah had an income tax, but
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no one until this case had doubted that Kennecott's income from its sales of copper and other mineral products
when finally sold in marketable form was income from
its Utah Copper ~line.

In concluding the argument with respect to the depletion allowance, we summarize :
The Comn1ission has violated the statutory 1nandate
which requires the allowance of a reasonable deduction
for dep1etion under the facts of Kennecott's particular
operations, because:

F-irst: a. The Commission acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in summarily refusing Kennecott's request
to depart from the state percentage method forinula
which it had originally accepted on the basis of two interpretations no longer existent; the first, the Commission's attempted change of the statute to base the percentage allowance on income from "mineral extraction"
rather from the wording ''from the property'' ; and the
second, the unprecedented federal taxes which under this
court's interpretation must first be deducted before computing depletion.
h. The Commission should have granted plaintiff's
request under these circumstances to transfer either to
the Utah cost-or-value method; or preferably to the
federa1 percentage method for computing depletion, or
at least some other method which would have afforded
a reasonhle allowance under the circumstances of this
case.

31
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Second: In any event, the Commission has acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and beyond its authority by misconstruing the law to permit allocating a portion of Kennecott's net income from its Utah mining property to
other processes on the basis of a self-proving formula.
4. The ·Tax Commission erred in that it has discriminated against this taxpay,er and is attempting to take its
property without due process of law in v\iolation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and
Sections 7 and 24, Article I, of the Constitution of the State
of Utah.

This point is directed to the action taken by the
Cmnmission outlined heretofore insofar as such action
violates plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff with
all others is to be afforded the equal protection of Utah's
laws without discrimination and in accordance with those
laws, under the well-known provisions of the state and
federal Constitutions above set forth.
a. But here, of all corporations engaged in business
in several states including Utah, Kennecott is to be saddled with the Commission's specia1 rules for allocating
income to this state for tax purposes. The record is silent
as to the basis for such special treatment unless it is that
the tax burden will be greater to the taxpayer.
b. And too, ~plaintiff alone is to be given the benefit
of Exhibit 4~the self-proving quadratic equation-even
though the result, as Inventor Allison candidly admitted,
may or may not have any relationship to a" reasonable"
allowance for depletion. (R. 92) No attempt-at least as
of this date-has been made by the defendant to allocate
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for depletion purposes any other mine's income ''from·
the property'' to such post-mine processes. (R. 106)
5. The Tax Commission erred in including in the tax
base subsidies paid to plaintiff by the F,ederal 'GoV1ermnent.
During 19-!2 the Federal Governn1ent paid to Kenneeott stipulated stuns in connection with its Utah operations as subsidies under the authority of 50 U. S. C. A.
App. 901-2. The Commission has included these amounts
as part of Kennecott's "gross income" for Utah Corporation Franchise Tax purposes. (R. 112; Stip. par. VI.)
Plaintiff concedes that Utah's corporation franchise
tax statutes are broad enough to include such subsidies
as "gross ineome," in contrast with the more limited
provisions of other Utah Tax statutes.
Overruling the United States District Court, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Federal
Government did not intend to exclude these subsidies
from this type of state taxation. (Kennecott Copper
Corporation et al. v. Sa:lt Lake County, 163 F. 2d 484.)
Admittedly it will therefore be difficult for this court to
do anything other than to follow the Circuit Court. Thus
while plaintiff submits the opinion of the Circuit Court
is erroneous, extended argument now, except to preserve
the point, would seem to serve no useful purpose.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, § 80-13-47 provides that there shall be
a plenary review by this court of the Commission's

33

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

actions based upon the record below, in effect as woUld be
in an equity case.
A judge trying such a cause would of course have to
make findings supported by competent evidence. ( § 10426-2, 3) No jury would be permitted to ignore or disregard without cause competent and material evidence;
(Leavitt v. Thurston, 33 U. 135, 143 P. 140; Karren v.
Bair, U. 334, 225 P. 1094); and the action of administrative tribunals must be consistent with, and even discretion must be exercised ''in accordance with established
principles of justice and not arbitrarily or capricious~y,
fraudulently, and without factual basis." ( 42 Am. Jur.
380, Sec. 69.)
Plaintiff respectfully submits that based on the record below and in accordance with these principles, the decision of the defendant State Tax Commission should be
set aside and the cause remanded with the following
directions :
That plaintiff's amended return, filed in accordance with § 80-13-21, should be treated as the basis for
computing the corporation franchise tax subject of course
to the usual' administrative review of its contents.
1.

2. That the~e should 'be excluded from gross income
the federal subsidies paid to Kennecott.
3. That in computing the required reasonable allowance for depletion:
a. The Commission under Utah's law may give
consideration to the advisabi'lity of permitting plaintiff
and all other mine operators to invoke the federal per34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

centage method for determining a ''reasonable allowance," subject to the Commission's rules and regulations.
b. In the alternative, the plaintiff be afforded an
election between the Utah percentage method (§ 80-138 (9b) ) as construed by this court in New Park Mining
Co. et al v. State Tax Commission, and the cost-or-value
method of§ 80-13-8 (9a).
c. That the Utah percentage Inethod as applied to
both Kennecott and other mine operators is to be construed to require as ''net income from the property'' the
inclusion of the net amounts actually received froin the
operator frmn the sale of the mine products in their
first nonnally 1narketable form, excluding income from
sources other than those connected in the full and natural
sense with the mining venture.

Respectfully submitted,

C. C. PARSONS,

WM.

:M.

M:cCR.EA,

A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
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